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Network Effects in Action 
Christopher S. Yoo* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Network effects, which arise when the value of a product or service increases with 
the number of people using it, represent one of the most influential concepts in industrial 
organization over the past half century. Although the concept was invoked during the 
early twentieth century,1 serious academic study of the phenomenon did not begin until 
publication of Jeffrey Rohlfs’s seminal paper in 1974.2 Starting in the mid-1980s, a vibrant 
theoretical literature emerged exploring how network effects can affect competition.3 The 
result was a rich and nuanced body of economic theory.4 
 Over time, network effects began to influence antitrust enforcement policy, 
forming the basis for the U.S. government’s cases against Microsoft5 and playing a 
prominent role in early antitrust cases against social networking sites.6 Although recent 
 
* John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science and Founding 
Director of the Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition at the University of Pennsylvania. 
1 See, e.g., AM. TEL. & TEL. CO., ANNUAL REPORT 21–22 (1908). 
2 See generally Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5 BELL J. ECON. 
& MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974). 
3 See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events, 99 
ECON. J. 116 (1989); Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 
332 (1985); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 
70 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. 
REV. 424 (1985).  
4 For recent surveys, see Daniel Birke, The Economics of Networks: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 23 J. 
ECON. SURVEYS 762 (2009); Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with 
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1967, 1971, 1974–76, 2055 
(Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007); Oz Shy, A Short Survey of Network Economics, 38 REV. INDUS. 
ORG. 119 (2011). 
5 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49-50, 55-56 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 939, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
6 See LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06-6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, at *8–10 (C.D. Cal. 
June 4, 2007), aff’d, 304 Fed. Appx. 554 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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high-profile reports on digital platforms have recognized the ambiguity of the impact of 
network effects, they have generally placed greater emphasis on their tendency to create 
winner-take-all markets that can provide first movers with a source of market power.7 
 Even the most casual examination of the history of digital industries reveals that 
the dynamics must be more complex. Google was founded in 1998, long after Altavista 
and Yahoo! had established themselves as market leaders. Facebook successfully 
overcame the early advantages enjoyed by Myspace. The market for travel sites consists 
of numerous players all vigorously competing with one another without collapsing into 
monopoly. Uber’s first-mover advantage was unable to prevent the emergence of Lyft as 
a serious competitor. 
 These examples underscore the inappropriateness of simply equating the presence 
of network effects with market concentration or entry barriers. Instead, they illustrate the 
importance of understanding the full range of the dynamics of markets subject to network 
effects. Even when potential theoretical harms have been identified, anticompetitive 
effects cannot simply be asserted. Instead, proper application of competition law 
principles requires that they be validated and quantified empirically. 
 This Chapter fills this gap by laying out the dynamics underlying network effects 
and how they have been applied in antitrust and regulatory proceedings. It begins by 
examining and exploring the theoretical and empirical limits of the possible bases of 
 
7 See AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION, DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY: FINAL REPORT 66–
68 (2019), available at https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry%20-
%20final%20report.pdf; DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION: REPORT OF 
THE DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL 35 (2019), available at https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_
digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf; JACQUES CRÉMER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE, & HEIKE 
SCHWEITZER, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE DIGITAL ERA: FINAL REPORT 20–24 (2019), available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf; STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF 
THE ECON. AND THE STATE, STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS 38–39 (2019), available at 
https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---committee-report---
stigler-center.pdf. 
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network effects, paying particular attention to the most commonly cited framework 
known as Metcalfe’s Law. It continues by exploring the concept of network externalities, 
defined as the positive external consumption benefits that the decision to join a network 
creates for the other members of the network,8 which is more ambiguous than commonly 
realized. It then reviews the structural factors needed for models based on network effects 
to have anticompetitive effects and identifies other factors that can dissipate those effects. 
Finally, it identifies alternative institutional forms that can eliminate or mitigate the 
impact of network effects. 
I. THEORETICAL SOURCES OF NETWORK EFFECTS 
 Network effects exist when the primary determinant of a network’s value is the 
number of other users connected to the network.9 The more people that an individual 
subscriber can reach through the network, the more valuable the network becomes even 
when the nature of the service and the price paid for it remains the same.10 The classic 
example is the telephone system, since the value of a telephone network is largely 
determined by the number of people with whom one can communicate through that 
network.11  
 A critical question is how quickly value grows with network size. Rapid increases 
would make the demand-side economies of scale associated with network effects 
extremely influential. More modest increases would render the effects of network size 
 
8 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 
822, 823 (1986). 
9 This discussion draws on work previously published as Christopher S. Yoo, Moore’s Law, Metcalfe’s Law, 
and Optimal Interoperability, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 87, 91-94, 96-102 (2015). 
10 Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Considerations, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 885, 922 (2003). 
11 See, e.g., Neil Gandal, Compatibility, Standardization, and Network Effects: Some Policy Implications, 18 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL. 80, 80–81 (2002); Katz & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 823 (1986); S.J. Liebowitz & 
Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 139-40 (1994).  
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less consequential. In addition, the law of diminishing marginal returns dictates that such 
increases in value are unlikely to persist indefinitely. A proper appreciation of network 
effects thus depends on understanding their theoretical foundations, as well as their 
theoretical limits, and the emerging empirical literature attempting to validate which of 
the various models best describes actual network behavior. 
A.  Metcalfe’s Law and Other Theories of the Relationship Between Network Size and Value 
 One of the most common ways to model the rapid increase in value associated 
with network size is known as Metcalfe’s Law, first articulated in the early 1980s by Bob 
Metcalfe, the inventor of the Ethernet,12 and later named in his honor by George Gilder.13 
Metcalfe’s Law is based on the mathematical concept that the number of potential 
pairwise connections increases quadratically with the number of nodes. Stated more 
generally, if the number of nodes equals n, the number of potential connections equals 
(n2 – n)/2. The relationship is illustrated by the examples portrayed in Figure 1. In each 










12 Bob Metcalfe, Metcalfe’s Law After 40 Years of Ethernet, 46 COMPUTER 26, 26-28 (2013). 
13 George Gilder, Metcalfe’s Law and Legacy, FORBES ASAP, Sept. 13, 1993, at 158. 
14 Bob Metcalfe, Metcalfe’s Law: A Network Becomes More Valuable as It Reaches More Users, INFOWORLD, Oct. 
2, 1995, at 53. 
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Figure 1: The Relationship Between the Number of Nodes and the Number of 
Potential Connections 
 
Source: Yoo, supra note 9, at 92 fig.1. 
 If each potential connection increases the value of the network by an equal 
amount, increases in the number of nodes lead to a quadratic increase in network value. 
At the same time, the cost of adding nodes is likely to increase linearly with the number 
of nodes. The relationship between the two effects is depicted in Figure 2, which Metcalfe 
used during the early 1980s to emphasize the importance of networks quickly reaching 
critical mass.  
Figure 2: Metcalfe’s Law and the Systemic Value of the Network 
 
Source: Bob Metcalfe, Metcalfe’s Law After 40 Years of Ethernet, COMPUTER, Dec. 2013, at 26, 28 fig. 2. 
 Metcalfe’s Law provides a demand-side explanation for the success of the 
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America Online,15 although some have suggested that the recent experiences of eBay and 
Facebook raise questions about the relationship.16 By valuing all internal connections, it 
is best suited to two-way communications networks. 
 Quadratic growth is not the only way to model the way the value of a network 
may increase with size. Some are more modest, such as Sarnoff’s Law, which asserts that 
the value of a network increases linearly with network size, as befits advertising 
networks. Another commonly posited relationship, known as Reed’s Law, is more 
aggressive, positing exponential growth in value at the rate of 2n.17 A more recent 
candidate known as Zipf’s Law falls somewhere between Metcalfe and Sarnoff, presuming 
that if some large collection of elements is ordered by value, the second element in the 
collection will have about half the value of the first one, the third one will have about 
one-third the value of the first one, and so forth, with the value of the nth item in the 
collection being 1/n of the first item. The result is a model that projects network value to 
increase logarithmically, specifically n log(n).18 The Briscoe, Odlyzko, and Tilley article 
proposing Zipf’s Law as an alternative spawned a vigorous debate over the merits of 
Metcalfe’s Law.19  
 All of these models lead to value curves that increase monotonically with network 
 
15 Metcalfe¸ supra note 12, at 27-28; Paul Festa, Andreesen Preaches AOL Religion, CNET (Jan. 2, 2002, 4:43 PM), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/andreessen-preaches-aol-religion; Gilder, supra note 13. 
16 Anthony Wing Kosner, Facebook Values Itself Based on Metcalfe’s Law, But the Market Is Using Zipf’s, FORBES 
TECH (May 31, 2012, 1:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonykosner/2012/05/31/facebook-values-
itself-based-on-metcalfes-law-but-the-market-is-using-zipfs/; Om Malik, Metcalfe’s Law, Meet Market 
Reality, GIGAOM (Jan. 21, 2015, 3:14 AM), https://gigaom.com/2005/01/21/metcalfes-law-meet-market-
reality/. 
17 David P. Reed, The Law of the Pack, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2001, at 23. 
18 Bob Briscoe, Andrew Odlyzko, & Benjamin Tilly, Metcalfe’s Law Is Wrong, IEEE SPECTRUM, July 2006, at 
34, 38. 
19 See Metcalfe’s Law: Right? Wrong?, IEEE SPECTRUM, Nov. 2006, at 10, http://spectrum.ieee.org 
/computing/networks/metcalfes-law-right-wrong/; Simeon Simeonov, Metcalfe’s Law: More Misunderstood 
than Wrong?, HIGH CONTRAST (July 26, 2006), http://blog.simeonov.com/2006/07/26/metcalfes-law-more-
misunderstood-than-wrong/. 
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size. That need not be the case, however. Some patterns in the growth of network value 
(such as 2–n) converge asymptotically to a limited value rather than grow continuously.20 
Models assume that network value follows a logistic curve generating S-shaped growth 
in value.21 The results thus depend heavily on the assumptions. 
 It is unlikely that any one functional form applies to all businesses subject to 
network effects. The idea that the same returns to scale would apply to search engines, 
social media, e-commerce, software, streaming media, and companies based on the 
sharing economy seems impossible. 
B.  The Theoretical Limits of Metcalfe’s Law 
 The choice among these models plays a critical role in determining the significance 
of the role played by network effects. One key factor is the fit between a model’s 
assumptions and the business model under consideration. For example, the growth in 
value envisaged by Metcalfe’s Law results from the increase in internal connections 
among each individual node. This seems appropriate for a two-way communications 
network such as a telephone network, in which every individual user may wish to contact 
each other. The value of advertising networks, in contrast, derives from the total number 
of potential customers that the advertiser can reach through the network and places no 
value on those potential customers’ ability to connect with each other. This implies a 
value curve that grows linearly as predicted by Sarnoff’s Law rather than the quadratic 
growth in value predicted by Metcalfe’s Law.22 
 Moreover, the possibility of unending quadratic increases in network value seems 
too good to be true, and for good reason. Indeed, Metcalfe himself warned that this 
 
20 Joe Weinman, Is Metcalfe’s Law Way Too Optimistic?, BUS. COMM. REV., Aug. 2007, at 18, 19-20. 
21 See G.M. Peter Swann, The Functional Form of Network Effects, 14 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 417, 423-25 (2002). 
22 Christopher S. Yoo, Free or Fee?: The Economics of Advertising Support vs. Direct Payments for Media Content, 
in MEDIA MARKETS AND COMPETITION LAW: MULTINATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 59, __ (Antonio Bavasso, David 
S. Evans, & Douglas H. Ginsburg eds., 2019). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3733669
The GAI Report on the Digital Economy 
 166 
relationship was unlikely to hold beyond a certain point.23 Simply put, models based on 
inexhaustible geometric progressions are the hallmark of classic pyramid schemes that 
are mathematically unsustainable. Proper implementation of network effects for 
competition policy thus depends on an appreciation of the role of diminishing marginal 
returns resulting from heterogeneity in the value of different connections and potential 
diseconomies of scale. 
1. Differences in the Value of Particular Connections 
 While it is undeniably true that the number of potential connections increases 
quadratically with the number of connections, that is not enough to establish the 
quadratic increase in value implied by Metcalfe’s Law. One must also assume that the 
additional connections each provide the same amount of additional value.  
 The literature on Metcalfe’s Law questions the validity of that assumption. For 
example, Jeffrey Rohlfs points out that if the first users are the ones who place the highest 
value on the network, one would expect the addition of later users to provide less value.24 
Failure to take this into account is “likely to substantially overstate the value of large 
networks.”25 In addition, “small user sets can embody substantial value.”26 Rohlfs then 
offers a mathematical formulation that can accommodate a wide range of assumptions 
about consumer heterogeneity and leads to market concentration only in some cases.27 
Briscoe, Odlyzko, and Tilly’s model based on Zipf’s Law provides a specific example of 
 
23 Metcalfe, supra note 14, at 53 (“OK, Metcalfe’s Law might overstate the value of a network for a very large 
N. A user equipped to communicate with 50 million other users might not have all that much to talk about 
with each of them. So maybe the growth of systemic network value rolls off after some N.”); Andrew 
McAfee & François-Xavier Oliveau, Confronting the Limits of Networks, SLOAN MGMT. REV., July 2002, at 86, 
http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/confronting-the-limits-of-networks/ (quoting Metcalfe as recognizing in 
1998, “The law may be optimistic as the number of people on a network gets very large.”). 
24 JEFFREY H. ROHLFS, BANDWAGON EFFECTS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 29 (2001). 
25 Id. at 55, 195. 
26 Id. at 85. 
27 Id. at 211-16. 
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this dynamic.28 Network participants who place a particularly high value on a small 
number of users can realize most of that value simply by clustering on a single network 
regardless of its size.29  
 If so, end users may not value the total number of potential connections in the 
abstract as much as they value particular connections. For example, most people’s 
Internet usage is disproportionately concentrated in a handful of locations, including 
their email servers, file repositories at work, banks and other financial institutions, 
utilities for bill payment, and preferred sources of content.30 These users place a higher 
value on connectivity to the sites they visit the most than their ability to connect to a large 
number of other locations.31 
 Differences in the value of particular connections can make larger networks easier 
to displace. A new competitor need not achieve the same scale as the incumbent in order 
to succeed. Instead, it can successfully enter by targeting a smaller cluster of users who 
value each other’s participation particularly highly.32 For example, customers of ride 
sharing services care less about the size of the entire network and instead place a high 
value on a subset of network participants, specifically those located in the same city.33 
Similarly, OpenTable succeeded only after it targeted achieving a critical mass of 
restaurants in four cities.34 These examples show how a new entrant can succeed 
 
28 Briscoe et al., supra note 18, at 37. 
29 McAfee & Oliveau, supra note 23, at 86. 
30 Christopher S. Yoo, Wickard for the Internet?: Network Neutrality After Verizon v. FCC, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 
415, 439 (2014). 
31 Id. 
32 Feng Zhu et al., Network Interconnectivity and Entry into Platform Markets 4–5 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working 
Paper 19-062, 2019), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/19-062_ca94ef8a-6589-4210-a598-
90900bd772e5.pdf. 
33 Feng Zhu & Marco Iansiti, Why Some Platforms Thrive and Others Don’t, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2019, 
at 118, 121. 
34 DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF MULTISIDED 
PLATFORMS 13-14 (2016). 
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notwithstanding network effects by achieving critical mass with clusters of users who 
value each other particularly highly.35 
 Perhaps the most extreme version of variations in the value of particular network 
connections is the phenomenon known as two-sided markets.36 Two-sided markets 
involve a particular type of network effects in which the network consists of two different 
groups of participants and the value to one group is determined not by the size of the 
entire network, but rather by the size of the other group. Credit card networks represent 
a classic example of a two-sided market. They consist of two types of participants: 
merchants and cardholders. The value to merchants is not determined by total network 
size, but rather by the number of cardholders. Conversely, the networks’ value to 
cardholders is determined by the number of merchants participating in it. Admittedly, 
cardholders benefit indirectly from having large numbers of other cardholders in that 
they encourage the participation of a greater number of merchants. But they would be 
just as happy if the network could attract a large number of merchants in ways that did 
not depend on having a large number of cardholders. 
 Pricing in two-sided markets depends on a wide variety of factors.37 Perhaps most 
striking is what Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole call the “seesaw principle,” in which 
any factor that tends to increase the profitability of one side of a two-sided market tends 
to lower prices on the other side, because the increased margin on the first side increases 
 
35 David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Debunking the “Network Effects” Bogeyman, REGULATION, Winter 
2017-2018, at 36, 38; Zhu & Iansiti, supra note 33, at 122. 
36 This discussion draws on work previously published as Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, 
Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 222–27. 
37 David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2007, at 11, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content 
/uploads/2015/04/Evans-Schmalensee-The-Industrial-Organization-of-Markets-with-Two-Sided-
Platforms-2007.pdf; Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. 
ECON. 645, 658–61 (2006). 
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the benefits of increasing participation on the second side.38 Consistent with this insight, 
a survey of real-world examples reveals that prices on different sides of two-sided 
markets tend to be asymmetric, with users on one side often paying little or nothing.39 
 Asymmetry in the value of particular connections can dissipate the impact of 
network effects and allow a smaller network to survive despite disadvantages in scale. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Amex decision40 provides a useful example: American 
Express was able to capture more than one quarter of the market for credit card 
transactions even though it had enrolled 88% fewer cardholders and roughly 30% fewer 
merchants than had Visa and MasterCard. Rather than compete for the entire market, 
American Express was able to compensate for its smaller scale by providing higher value 
services designed to appeal to a subset of the overall population, specifically higher value 
cardholders.41 
 These examples underscore how differences in the value of particular connections 
can allow firms to enter and survive in markets with network effects notwithstanding 
their smaller network size. In so doing, they illustrate that the mere presence of network 
effects does not necessarily give the largest firm a decisive competitive advantage. The 
clear implication is that any anticompetitive effects stemming from network effects must 
be based on evidence in particular cases and not simply asserted. 
2. Other Ways Network Size Affects Value 
 The approach to theorizing about network effects discussed above implicitly 
presumes that network value is strictly increasing in the number of connections and differ 
only regarding the rate of increase. Any such model assumes away the existence of factors 
 
38 Id. at 659. 
39 Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990, 
1013-17 (2003). 
40 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
41 Id. at 2282, 2288. 
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that can create diseconomies of scale. 
 The literature has pointed out the possibility of countervailing considerations. For 
example, several phenomena can cause network value to decrease with scale, including 
saturation, cacophony, clustering, and search costs.42 Other relevant factors may include 
limits on time and capacity,43 as well as frictional effects and trust costs.44 
 Presuming inexhaustible returns to scale is arguably both unrealistic and risks 
making market failure more an artifact of the model than reality. Metcalfe himself 
emphasizes that his point was to underscore the importance of establishing a critical 
mass, not to prove inexhaustible returns to network size, and that Zipf’s Law also results 
in inexhaustible returns to scale.45 The assumptions that all connections have equal value 
and diseconomies of scale do not exist have the effect of positing inexhaustible benefits 
to network size that make the bias towards concentration drive the results of these models 
more than any aspect of actual markets.46  
C.  The Empirical Literature 
 These critiques underscore the point that simply assuming that all connections 
contribute equal value represents a potentially fundamental flaw. Empirical studies 
indicate that people do not value all connections equally. For example, in traditional 
telephone service, people tend to make frequent calls to a small group of people.47 The 
 
42 McAfee & Oliveau, supra note 23, at 86. 
43 See Weinman, supra note 20, at 20. 
44 Samuel M. Smith, Meta-Platforms and Cooperative Network-of-Network Effects, SELFRULE (Mar. 25, 2019), 
https://medium.com/selfrule/meta-platforms-and-cooperative-network-of-networks-effects-6e61eb15c586; 
Simeon Simeonov, Metcalfe’s Law: More Misunderstood than Wrong?, HIGHCONTRAST (July 26, 2006), 
http://blog.simeonov.com/2006/07/26/metcalfes-law-more-misunderstood-than-wrong/. 
45 Metcalfe¸ supra note 12, at 29; Bob Metcalfe, Metcalfe’s Law Recurses Down the Long Tail of Social Networking, 
VCMIKE’S BLOG (Aug. 18, 2006), https://vcmike.wordpress.com/2006/08/18/metcalfe-social-networks/. 
46 S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market Failure?, 17 RES. 
LAW & ECON. 1, 14–15 (1995). 
47 Douglas Galbi, Telephone Social Networks, PURPLE MOTES (Nov. 29, 2009), http://purplemotes 
.net/2009/11/29/telephone-social-networks/ (empirically concluding that the average American calls only 
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same appears to be true for Internet-based communications, as shown by studies 
indicating that the average Facebook user actively exchanges personal messages with no 
more four people per week and six people per month.48 Furthermore, the fact that the 
average Facebook user has 150 friends is consistent with Dunbar’s number, which 
suggests that the human brain can maintain no more than 150 close relationships at any 
one time.49  
 The debate over the relative merits of Metcalfe’s and Zipf’s Law has led to the first 
attempts to validate those principles empirically. Metcalfe himself kicked off this line of 
research by presenting an empirical analysis based on Facebook data finding that value 
growth more resembled Metcalfe’s Law than Zipf’s Law,50 a result that other scholars 
subsequently confirmed.51 Another empirical study found that seven user capabilities 
followed Metcalfe’s Law, while two others followed Zipf’s.52 A subsequent analysis 
disputed that finding once four correcting factors are taken into account.53 Still another 
regression analysis of the market value of thirty-eight public firms suggested that Zipf’s 
Law performs better than Metcalfe’s.54 
 
five people more than once in a given month). 
48 PAUL ADAMS, GROUPED: HOW SMALL GROUPS OF FRIENDS ARE THE KEY TO INFLUENCE ON THE WEB 23 (2012). 
49 R.I.M. Dunbar, Coevolution of Neocortex Size, Group Size and Language in Humans, 16 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 
681, 685-87 (1993). 
50 Metcalfe, supra note 12, at 30. 
51 Xing-Zhou Zhang, Jing-Jie Liu, & Zhi-Wei Xu, Tencent and Facebook Data Validate Metcalfe’s Law, 30 J. 
COMPUTER SCI. & TECH. 246 (2015); Leo Van Hove, Metcalfe’s Law and Network Quality: An Extension of Zhang 
et al., 31 J. COMPUTER SCI. & TECH. 117 (2016) (confirming this result when controlling for changes in 
network quality over time). Interestingly, the Zhang et al. study found that the costs reported in Facebook’s 
and Tencent’s financial reports grew quadratically with network size instead of linearly as Metcalfe 
hypothesized, although the authors simply reported this empirical finding without offering any 
explanation for it. Zhang et al., supra note 51, at 247, 248–49, 250. The surprising nature of this finding calls 
for further investigation. 
52 António Madureira et al., Empirical Validation of Metcalfe’s Law: How Internet Usage Patterns Have Changed 
Over Time, 25 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 246 (2013). 
53 Leo Van Hove, Testing Metcalfe’s Law: Pitfalls and Possibilities, 37 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 67 (2016). 
54 Zhou & Marshall van Alstyne, Platform Value and Network Effects 14–15 (2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
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 The nascent state of the empirical literature and the theoretical connection between 
the type of business model (advertising and Sarnoff’s Law, pairwise communication and 
Metcalfe’s Law, and group-forming networks and Reed’s Law) underscore the dangers 
of simply presuming network effects lead to concentrated markets. This is consistent with 
modern competition policy’s insistence that adverse economic effects must be 
demonstrated instead of simply being asserted. 
II. THE THEORETICAL AMBIGUITY OF NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 
 Many of the concerns raised by network effects focus on the theoretical possibility 
of network externalities.55 Proponents of this viewpoint suggest that network users’ 
inability to appropriate all of the benefits generated by their decision to join a new 
network represents a positive externality that will cause them not to adopt the network 
even when doing so would be socially beneficial. These theorists also suggest that 
network externalities can turn network incompatibility into a competitive weapon. 
Network effects gives users forced to choose among incompatible networks strong 
incentives to flock to the largest network. This can create a positive feedback loop that 
confers competitive advantages to first movers and large players.56 
 In addition, other scholars argue that network externalities can cause a related 
market failure known as technology lock-in, in which markets adhere to previous 
technology commitments notwithstanding the arrival of new, more efficient network 
technologies. If users cannot capture all of the benefits created by their decision to adopt 
a new technology, they may refrain from making a technological change even when 
 
http://questromworld.bu.edu/platformstrategy/files/2019/07/PlatStrat2019_paper_44.pdf. 
55 This discussion draws on work previously published as Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media 
Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 278–85 (2002); and Spulber & Yoo, supra note 10, at 
921–31. 
56 Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and 
Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940 (1986); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network 
Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 94–95, 105–06 (1994). 
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doing so would increase total welfare.57 These interpretations suggest that network 
industries may be uniquely susceptible to market failures. 
 A close examination of the foundational literature on network effects reveals that 
reducing network externalities to the harms to innovation associated with these 
phenomena is far too simplistic. As Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner point out in their 
seminal work, a consumer’s decision to join a new network actually gives rise to not one, 
but two distinct and countervailing externalities. On the one hand, it enhances the value 
of the network that the user is joining. As noted earlier, the inability to capture all of the 
benefits created by his or her adoption decision may make the market reluctant to adopt 
a new technology, even when doing so is in society’s best interest. This can cause markets 
to become locked in to obsolete technologies, a phenomenon that Farrell and Saloner refer 
to as “excess inertia.”58 
 At the same time, the adoption of a new technology also gives rise to a 
countervailing negative externality that may produce precisely the opposite effect. This 
is because any decision to adopt a new technology simultaneously lowers the value of 
the old network by reducing the number of people using it. Just as individuals switching 
networks do not internalize the increase in value they confer on participants in the new 
network, they also do not fully internalize the costs they impose on participants in the 
old network. If the negative externalities exceed the positive externalities, an individual 
would be willing to adopt a new network even when the net costs to society exceed the 
net benefits, a situation variously called “excess momentum” or “insufficient friction.”59 
Indeed, under network effects, the departure of a few network participants can touch off 
 
57 Farrell & Saloner, supra note 56, at 941; Katz & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 100. 
58 Farrell & Saloner, supra note 56, at 941–42.  
59 Compare id. at 942 (defining “excess momentum” as “the inefficient adoption of a new technology”), with 
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 55, 73 
(1992) (defining “insufficient friction” as “a bias towards new technology”). 
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a negative feedback cycle that accelerates a network’s decline. 
 The early literature on network effects has largely overlooked the potential for 
network externalities to accelerate the decline of incumbents. The history of the digital 
industry is littered with former market leaders such as America Online, MSN Messenger, 
Friendster, Myspace, and Orkut that experienced the negative side of network effects.60 
 It is thus theoretically possible that the presence of network economic effects may 
make markets tend to displace networks more easily or less easily than is socially optimal. 
The overall effect is largely determined by which of the two opposing externalities 
dominates the other. This means that network effects cannot simply be invoked as 
inevitably leading to winner-take-all markets or first-mover advantages that restrict 
competition. Instead, any market power enjoyed by large networks is properly regarded 
as an empirical question that must be shown in individual cases instead of simply being 
asserted. 
III. THE DEPENDENCE ON STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
 Both the literature around Metcalfe’s Law and the seminal articles on network 
effects illustrate that the net impact of network effects is ambiguous as a theoretical 
matter. In addition, a close examination of the literature reveals that any anticompetitive 
effects depend on the presence or absence of certain structural factors. The dependence 
of network effects models on these structural preconditions provide a further reason for 
rejecting attempts to equate the mere presence of network effects with market failure. 
A.  Market Structure 
 Because so much of the literature on network economic effects focuses on the 
potentially anticompetitive consequences of tipping and lock-in, it is often overlooked 
that the primary effect of network economic effects is to provide powerful incentives to 
 
60 Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 35, at 38. 
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interconnect.61 The formal economic models that show how network effects can create 
market failure depend on the assumption that the relevant markets are either dominated 
by a single firm or are highly concentrated.62 In the absence of such market structures, the 
primary impact of network economic effects is to provide powerful incentives for 
network owners to make their network compatible and interconnect with one another.63  
 For example, in a market in which five equally sized players are part of a 
compatible network, any player that opted for incompatibility would put itself at a 
tremendous competitive disadvantage.64 In the absence of market concentration, a firm 
cannot plausibly use its interconnection policies to harm competition.  
 This conclusion is reflected in the FCC’s policy toward wireless-to-wireless 
interconnection, in which the FCC declined to intervene because in the absence of a 
dominant player, competition already provides wireless providers with sufficient 
incentives to interconnect.65 The FCC took a similar position with respect to backbone 
interconnection when approving the Verizon-MCI and SBC-AT&T mergers, concluding 
that “[s]o long as there is ‘rough equality’ among backbone providers, each has an 
 
61 This discussion draws on work previously published as Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, 
Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1889–96 
(2007). 
62 Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 117, 119–29 (1994); Jacques Crémer, Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Connectivity in the Commercial 
Internet, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 433, 444 (2000); Katz & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 839–40; Rohlfs, supra note 2, at 
32. 
63 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 109. 
64 Gerald R. Faulhaber, Bottlenecks and Bandwagons: Access Policy in the New Telecommunications, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 487, 501–02 (Sumit K. Majumdar et al. eds., 2005); see also 
Nicholas Economides, The Economics of the Internet Backbone, in 2 HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ECONOMICS, supra note 64, at 373, 390 (recognizing that network economic effects give firms strong 
incentives to interconnect); Katz & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 429 (noting that “[a]s the number of firms 
becomes increasingly large,” equilibrium in which all firms interconnect converges to perfectly competitive 
equilibrium); Katz & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 105 (noting that “[i]n markets with network effects, there is 
natural tendency toward de facto standardization . . .”). 
65 Interconnection & Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Fourth Report 
and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 13523, 13534 ¶ 28 (2000). 
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incentive to peer with the others to provide universal connectivity to the Internet.”66 It 
reiterated this position when approving AT&T’s acquisition of BellSouth.67 Conversely, 
in approving WorldCom’s acquisition of MCI, the FCC was concerned that the merged 
company would have a sufficiently dominant market share to harm competition in the 
backbone market. Consequently, the FCC made divestiture of MCI’s backbone business 
a condition to its approval of the merger. At the same time, the FCC declined to mandate 
interconnection as a separate merger condition. The divestiture of MCI’s backbone 
business ensured that the market would remain sufficiently competitive to make direct 
regulation of interconnection unnecessary.68 
 The theoretical literature does identify one scenario in which participants in a 
market without a dominant player may nonetheless refuse to interconnect. If the market 
consists of two players of equal size, they may reject compatibility and instead engage in 
a race for the market. Interestingly, though, this type of competition does not necessarily 
lead to the delays in technology adoption and supracompetitive returns associated with 
refusals to interconnect by dominant firms.69 It also has the virtue of promoting the rapid 
buildout of new network technologies and yields substantial consumer benefits while the 
race is ongoing.70 
 
66 Verizon Communications, Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 18433, 18496 ¶ 118 (2005); SBC Communications, Inc. and 
AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC 
Rcd. 18290, 18354 ¶ 117 (2005). 
67 AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
22 FCC Rcd. 5662, 5731 ¶ 129, 5734-36 ¶¶ 140–144 (2007). 
68 Application of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI Communications Corp. for Transfer of Control of MCI 
Communications Corp. to WorldCom, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 18025, 18108–
11 ¶¶ 150-151, 18115 ¶ 155 (1998). 
69 Besen & Farrell, supra note 62, at 119-20, 122–24 (noting how competition between incompatible networks 
can accelerate as well as delay market growth, may dissipate any supracompetitive returns, and may lead 
to penetration pricing and long-term commitments to lower prices) 
70 Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable Television 
Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1351–55 (1986). 
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 Indeed, this appears to be what was occurring between 1893 and 1907, when the 
Bell System and the independent telephone systems engaged in what amounted to a race 
for the market by investing heavily in providing service to the smaller cities, suburbs, 
and rural areas that the Bell System’s focus on long distance commercial traffic had 
caused it to bypass.71 This competition emerged even though patent protection allowed 
the Bell System to enjoy a large initial lead. 
 Even if one large firm emerges, smaller groups can compensate by cooperating to 
form a network of equal or larger size. Customers that are reluctant to leave themselves 
vulnerable to being exploited by an emerging monopolist have additional reasons to 
adopt the network supported by the consortium.72 Many scholars believe that this 
dynamic played a key role in the battle between Betamax and VHS to become the 
standard for video cassette recorders. What is sometimes forgotten is that Betamax 
launched first and was able to capture a large in initial lead. The simplistic vision of 
network effects would conclude that the larger size of its network would create a 
competitive advantage that later standards could not match. JVC countered by using 
licensing to recruit a large consortium of equipment manufacturers willing to support 
VHS.73 In this way, smaller players can cooperate to counterbalance disadvantages in size. 
 This dynamic also puts the lie to the oft-asserted claim that network effects 
allowed the Bell System to drive its competitors out of business simply by refusing to 
interconnect with them.74 A close analysis of the market conditions renders this 
 
71 MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE 39–42, 55–60, 70–71, 74–75 (1997); Richard Gabel, The Early 
Competitive Era in Telephone Communications, 1893-1920, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 340, 344–45 (1969). 
72 Smith, supra note 44. 
73 Michael A. Cusumano, Yiorgis Mylonadis, & Richard S. Rosenbloom, Strategic Maneuvering and Mass-
Market Dynamics: The Triumph of VHS over Beta, 66 BUS. HIST. REV. 51, 72–76 (1992); Masaaki Kotabe, Arvind 
Sahay, & Preet S. Aulakh, Emerging Role of Technology Licensing in the Development of Global Product Strategy: 
Conceptual Framework and Research Propositions, 69 J. MARKETING 73, 77 (1996). 
74 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1046 
n.19 (1996) (arguing that refusing to interconnect with its smaller rivals allowed the Bell System to acquire 
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perspective implausible. Because the independents had captured 51% of the market by 
1907,75 the independents could have defeated whatever advantage the Bell System might 
have gained from its refusal to interconnect simply by banding together to make a 
network of equal size.76 In addition, the independents were the dominant providers of 
local telephone service in many parts of the Midwest. Given that the vast majority of 
calling was local, network effects should have given the independents the competitive 
advantage in those areas.77 
 The traditional account is also belied by the business strategy pursued by the 
independents. If the Bell System had been in a dominant position, one would have 
expected the independents to have been clamoring to interconnect with it. In fact, the 
independents did not want to interconnect with the Bell System any more than the Bell 
System wanted to interconnect with the independents. In many cases, having been the 
first to establish connections to surrounding areas and a strong position in regions such 
as the Midwest, the independents were able to use network economic effects to their 
advantage. Any suggestion that the Bell System was able to use refusal to interconnect as 
a competitive weapon is further belied by the fact that the Bell System began to regain its 
dominance only after it abandoned its policy of refusing to interconnect with the 
independents.78 
 
nearly 90% of the market by 1920); Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network 
Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (pointing to AT&T’s refusal to interconnect with independent 
competitors during the early twentieth century as an example of how network effects can lead to 
monopoly). 
75 Robert Bornholz & David S. Evans, The Early History of Competition in the Telephone Industry, in BREAKING 
UP BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 7, 13 (David S. Evans ed., 1983); see also 
Gabel, supra note 71, at 344 (reporting 3.0 million independent lines in 1907, compared with 3.1 million Bell 
lines). 
76 Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in THE 
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 292 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989). 
77 Peter Decherney, Nathan Ensmenger, & Christopher S. Yoo, Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat 
It?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1627, 1632–33 (2011). 
78 MUELLER, supra note 71, at 10, 51, 55–60, 72–80, 107–10, 115–17, 121–22; Bornholz & Evans, supra note 75, 
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 Instead, the reemergence of the telephone monopoly was driven by a change in 
strategy in 1907. Recognizing that its attempt to outbuild the independents had failed, 
the Bell System pursued two classic anticompetitive strategies. First, it sought to merge 
to monopoly by acquiring independent systems. Second, if the independent refused to be 
acquired, the Bell System would instead adopt the equally classic anticompetitive 
practice of dividing the market with the independent by offering to withdraw from the 
territory in return for the independent’s promise to restrict its activities to a “small and 
compact” territory and to interconnect exclusively with the Bell System’s long distance 
network. The biggest problem with the disappearance of competition was pricing. 
Therefore, the Bell System dropped its previous opposition to government intervention 
and instead embraced rate regulation as an alternative to competition as a means for 
reining in price. As part of this regulatory compact, the Bell System insisted on protection 
against entry.79 Although the Justice Department initially erected the Kingsbury 
Commitment to prevent such acquisitions, adherence to sound antitrust principles would 
disappear when the federal government took over the telephone network during World 
War I, when Postmaster General Albert Burleson sought to adopt the postal solution to 
universal service through rate averaging by ensuring each provider enjoyed a monopoly 
area.80 
 In the end, the regulatory regime created by the Kingsbury Commitment was 
abolished (with the full support of the independents) by the enactment of the Willis-
Graham Act, which shifted responsibility for reviewing telephone mergers from the 
 
at 25–27; Gabel, supra note 71, at 353–54; David F. Weiman & Richard C. Levin, Preying for Monopoly? The 
Case of Southern Bell Telephone Company, 1894-1912, 102 J. POL. ECON. 103, 115, 118 (1994). 
79 MUELLER, supra note 71, at 78, 99–100, 107–13, 127–28; Gabel, supra note 71, at 355–58; Weiman & Levin, 
supra note 78, at 118, 120–25. 
80 Michael A. Janson & Christopher S. Yoo, The Wires Go to War: The U.S. Experiment with Government 
Ownership of the Telephone System During World War I, 91 TEX. L. REV. 983, 1013–17 (2013).  
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antitrust authorities to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).81 The ICC became a 
rubber stamp that approved essentially all telecommunications mergers.82 During this 
period, both the Bell System and the independents also endorsed rate regulation of local 
telephone services by state public utility commissions.83 
 The eventual emergence of a telephone monopoly was thus the result of classic 
anticompetitive strategies that were unfortunately condoned by the government because 
price competition would be replaced by rate regulation. When properly understood, this 
history shows that the market dominance typically attributed to the use of the refusal to 
interconnect to leverage network effects was actually the result of other factors. 
B.  Size of Technical Improvements 
 Another factor that can enable a new technology to dislodge an incumbent despite 
network effects is the provision of additional value that exceeds the value derived from 
the size of the old network.84 The larger the increase in value, the easier it is to overcome 
the impact of network effects.85 This is particularly true given that in sufficiently large 
networks, the marginal benefit from adding another subscriber is likely to be low, which 
greatly reduces network economic effects’ marginal impact.86  
 
81 Ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921). 
82 BUREAU OF STATISTICS, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM’N, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ACTIVITIES, 
1887-1937, at 201 (1937); Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and 
Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 3, 8 n.25 (Max D. 
Paglin ed., 1989). 
83 MUELLER, supra note 71, at 99–100; Gabel, supra note 71, at 357; Robinson, supra note 82, at 6–7. 
84 This discussion draws on work previously published as Spulber & Yoo, supra note 10, at 928, 931. 
85 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 106 (observing that new, incompatible standards may emerge despite 
the presence of network externalities if “consumers . . . care more about product attributes than network 
size.”); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1990) (“The greater 
the gap in performance between two standards, . . . the more likely that a move to the efficient standard 
will take place.”). 
86 BRIDGER M. MITCHELL & INGO VOGELSANG, TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRICING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 55 
(1991); A. de Fontenay & J.T. Lee, B.C./Alberta Long Distance Calling, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 199, 207-09 (Léon Courville et al. eds. 1983); G. Yarrow, 
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 Technical superiority is what allowed Sega to overcome Nintendo’s large 
preexisting installed base by releasing a 16-bit video game platform that represented a 
clear advance over Nintendo’s 8-bit technology87 and helped Xbox enter despite the large 
scale enjoyed by PlayStation 2.88 Another example is the role that consumers’ preferences 
for VHS’s ability to deliver longer playing times over Betamax’s greater portability 
played a large role in allowing VHS to overcome the fact that Betamax launched one year 
earlier and established an early lead.89 Superior quality allowed Excel to displace Lotus 
1-2-3, Quicken to displace Managing Your Money, and Word to displace WordStar and 
WordPerfect, despite being at significant size disadvantages.90 
 An oft-cited supposed counterexample is the QWERTY keyboard, which 
supposedly represents an obsolete technology locked into place by network effects 
despite the emergence of a superior technology.91 This assertion is belied by the fact that 
QWERTY consistently beat its competitors in typing speed competitions, with the only 
evidence to the contrary being tests riddled with conflicts of interest conducted by the 
inventor and chief proponent of a rival keyboard.92  
 
Dealing with Social Obligations in Telecoms, in REGULATING UTILITIES: A TIME FOR CHANGE? 67 (S. Sayer et al. 
eds., 1996). 
87 Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Analysis in High-Tech Industries: A 19th 
Century Discipline Addresses 21st Century Problems, Remarks before American Bar Association Section 
of Antitrust Law’s Antitrust Issues in High-Tech Industries Workshop (Feb. 25, 1999) (transcript available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/hitch.htm). 
88 Feng Zhu & Marco Iansiti, Entry into Platform Markets, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 88, 98–100 (2012). 
89 S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 218–
20 (1995). But see Hiroshi Ohashi, The Role of Network Effects in the US VCR Market, 1978-1986, 12 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRATEGY 447, 475 (2003) (attributing VHS’s success to its superiority in the characteristics domain 
through 1982, but finding that network effects during late years); Sangin Park, Quantitative Analysis of 
Network Externalities in Competing Technologies, The VCR Case, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 937, 944 (2004) (same). 
90 Gerald J. Tellis, Eden Yin, & Rakesh Niraj, Does Quality Win? Network Effects Versus Quality in High-Tech 
Markets, 44 J. MKTG. RES. 135, 140–43 (2009). 
91 David, supra note 3. 
92 Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 85, at 8–21; Neil M. Kay, Rerun the Tape of History and QWERTY Always 
Wins, 42 RES POL’Y 1175 (2013). 
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 Perhaps most importantly for the current debate, the superiority of Google’s 
PageRank algorithm helped it overcome any advantages given by Altavista’s and 
Yahoo!’s greater initial network size despite the fact that Google was a relative latecomer 
to the search engine game.93 Development of a superior product is also reported to have 
played a role in Facebook’s success in overcoming the multiyear head start enjoyed by 
Myspace.94 The iPhone’s (and later Android’s) superior user interface allowed it to 
displace Nokia’s dominant Symbian platform notwithstanding Symbian’s dominant 
market position.  
 More systematic empirical research confirms the key role of technological 
superiority. A study of nineteen products and services relating to personal computers 
found frequent changes in market leadership driven by improvements in quality, a result 
inconsistent with simple winner-take-all inferences from being the first to market.95 
Furthermore, although both network effects and quality affect market share, quality 
proves more important. Network effects may delay higher-quality products from taking 
over the market.96 Subsequent empirical work has confirmed how product quality can 
overcome first-mover advantages and network size.97 
C.  Market Growth 
 Another structural feature that can dissipate the impact of network effects is 
explosive growth in demand.98 In growing markets, the number of users who have 
 
93 Justus Haucap & Ulrich Heimeshoff, Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the Internet Driving Competition or 
Marketplace Monopolization?, 11 INT’L ECON. & ECON. POL’Y 49, 55 (2014). 
94 Alexia Tsotsis, Sean Parker on Why Myspace Lost to Facebook, TECHCRUNCH (June 28, 2011, 7:42 PM EDT), 
https://techcrunch.com/2011/06/28/sean-parker-on-why-myspace-lost-to-facebook/. 
95 Tellis et al., supra note 90, at 147. 
96 Id. 
97 David P. McIntyre, In a Network Industry, Does Product Quality Matter?, 28 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 
99 (2011); Zhu & Iansiti, supra 88. 
98 This discussion draws on work previously published as Yoo, supra note 55, at 280. 
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already made commitments to a particular technology is small compared to the number 
who will do so in the future. In such cases, the current market shares of particular firms 
are of little consequence. In short, networks’ value depends on the size they will attain in 
the future rather the size that they have attained today.99 
 Expectations about future growth played a role in VHS’s ability to overtake the 
early lead established by Betamax.100 The importance of rapid market growth also helps 
explain how late-arriver Google (launched in 1998) was able to displace early market 
leaders such as Altavista, since it was only in the mid-1990s, following the development 
of hypertext market language (HTML) and the first graphic-oriented browser (Mosaic), 
that the number of U.S. Internet users began to take off.101 The existence of a large 
percentage of users who had not yet adopted social networking similarly helps explain 
how Facebook was able to overcome Myspace’s initial market dominance.102 
D.  Variations in Consumer Preferences for Different Network Designs 
 Much as differences in the value placed on the ability to connect with particular 
endpoints can dissipate the impact of network effects, so can heterogeneity in consumer 
preferences in network architecture.103 As Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro note:  
Customer heterogeneity and product differentiation tend to limit tipping and sustain multiple 
networks. If the rival systems have distinct features sought by certain customers, two or more 
systems may be able to survive by catering to consumers who care more about product 
attributes than network size. Here, market equilibrium with multiple incompatible products 
 
99 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 59, at 67, 73; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be 
a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 292, 312 (1996); Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and 
Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 490 (1995). 
100 Park, supra note 89, at 944. 
101 CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET: HOW TECHNOLOGY, USERS, AND BUSINESSES ARE 
TRANSFORMING THE NETWORK 21 (2012). 
102 Gil Press, Why Facebook Triumphed Over All Other Social Networks, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2018, 4:11 PM EDT), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2018/04/08/why-facebook-triumphed-over-all-other-social-
networks/#2afa2ffe6e91. 
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reflects the social value of variety.104  
Indeed, if what consumers want from the network is sufficiently heterogeneous, they will 
derive greater value from using a network better tailored to their preferences than from 
belonging to a larger network, and the equilibrium and welfare maximizing outcome will 
be multiple incompatible networks. 
 The point is demonstrated eloquently by a simple model put forth by Joseph 
Farrell and Garth Saloner, who wrote some of the pioneering papers on network 
economic effects. Assume that two different populations of end users each would prefer 
a slightly different standard and that both would benefit from network economic effects 
if they were part of the same network. Each group has two options: It can join the other 
group’s standard, in which case it gains from being part of a larger network, but loses 
value from adopting a standard that it prefers less. Or it can adhere to its preferred 
standard, in which case it benefits from consuming its preferred standard, but foregoes 
the benefits of network economic effects should the other group adhere to its preferred 
standard as well.105 
 The considerations driving the equilibrium are clear. If the value that either group 
derives from consuming its preferred standard is sufficiently large, the greater value will 
induce it to adopt its preferred standard even if it means being part of a smaller network. 
Any welfare losses from network fragmentation are more than offset by gains in allowing 
groups of end users to consume a standard that is a better fit with their preferences. Thus, 
much as monopolistic competition shows how heterogeneity in consumer preferences for 
different products can allow multiple firms to compete despite the presence of supply-
side economies of scale caused by declining average costs, these models show how this 
same factor can overcome the demand-side economies of scale associated with network 
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effects. 
 Allowing for the possibility of heterogeneity in consumer preferences for different 
network architectures can cause the bias towards a single network to disappear and 
permits stable equilibria with multiple networks each serving a subsegment of the overall 
market. The classic example is the co-existence of IBM and Apple as manufacturers of 
personal computers (PCs) during the 1980s and 1990s notwithstanding the presence of 
network effects and IBM’s significantly larger scale. The same dynamics appear to be 
allowing iOS to survive despite Android’s larger installed base. 
E.  Large Customers 
 The presence of large customers and suppliers can alleviate the impact of network 
effects. Firms that occupy a large proportion of a particular network may make that 
network less susceptible to becoming locked into any particular technology because their 
sheer size allows them to internalize a large proportion of the benefits of their network 
adoption decisions.106 The existence of large players thus represents one way in which the 
problems of network externalities may be circumvented. A prime example is how quickly 
the standards battle between Blu-ray and HD-DVD ended after Walmart committed to 
Blu-ray.107 
* * * 
 The theory and empirics on network effects, thus, reinforce the idea that certain 
structural preconditions must be satisfied before network effects can harm competition. 
Network effects cannot be simply equated with market concentration and market failure 
without the development of a detailed factual record, as required by traditional antitrust 
principles. 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL FORMS 
 Even in cases where the structure of network effects, the size of the countervailing 
externalities, and the structural conditions can support plausible claims that the presence 
of network effects can lead to market failure, a complete analysis requires consideration 
of whether alternative institutional forms exist that can counteract or mitigate these 
problems. Indeed, many networks contain institutional features that provide other ways 
to offset the impact of network effects. 
A.  Classic Responses to Positive Externalities 
1. Coasean Markets 
 As noted earlier, a major source of potential problems is the presence of positive 
network externalities that confer benefits on others that the actor joining the network does 
not internalize. Positive externalities can lead to activity levels that fall below welfare-
maximizing levels. 
 One classic solution to positive network externalities follows from Coase.108 In 
response to Pigou’s claim that all positive externalities should be subsidized by the 
government, Coase showed how private parties can bargain around externalities so long 
as sufficient markets exist to enable them to do so.109 
 This suggests a straightforward solution to positive network externalities. 
Network owners can allow users who are joining a new network to internalize all of the 
benefits of their adoption decision simply by giving those users a discount equal to the 
benefits they are conferring on existing network participants.110 The fact that the benefits 
resulting from any increase in the network’s value would accrue directly to the network 
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owner effectively aligns social benefits with private benefits. Such introductory pricing 
schemes are legion. 
2. Vertical Integration and Restraints 
 Although Coasean markets work for direct network effects, which arise when 
value is determined by the number of people who have adopted the same technology, 
other solutions are possible when the network effects are indirect, which arise when value 
is determined by the number of people who have adopted complementary goods and 
services.111 The literature on network effects emphasizes how vertical integration can 
incentivize production of both the primary and complementary products.112 The 
literature on General Purpose Technologies (GPTs), a related concept that also focuses on 
technologies that generate positive externalities, similarly indicates that vertical 
integration can allow the producers of the platform technology to internalize more of the 
positive externalities they generate for complementary products.113  
 This argument fits into a long tradition of theories exploring how the degree of 
vertical integration varies over the course of an industry’s life cycle. The best-known 
theory was offered by Nobel laureate George Stigler. Stigler argues that vertical 
integration in an industry follows a “U” shape over time, beginning as vertically 
integrated, transitioning to vertically disintegrated as the industry matures, and then 
returning once again to vertically integrated as the industry declines. Because young 
industries often employ new materials and technologies that are typically unavailable on 
the open market, firms operating in these industries must produce all of their key inputs 
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themselves. As demand for the product becomes better established, production becomes 
sufficiently large, and risk drops to the point where third parties have strong incentives 
to begin providing these inputs. When the industry enters its decline phase, the decline 
in sales volume causes third-party input providers to disappear, and firms operating in 
this industry must once again provide these inputs for themselves.114 Indeed, two-sided 
markets that require the simultaneous development of complementary products often 
rely on a single, vertically integrated player to get both sides on board.115 
 History has many examples of this dynamic. The broadcasting and cable 
industries relied on vertical integration to meet the need for expanded content during 
their early years.116 Other examples include the fact that Apple relied on its proprietary 
software provider Claris to produce the first generation of software for the Macintosh.117 
Such practices are likely to benefit consumers. Several recent surveys of the empirical 
literature of vertical integration and restraints found that the overwhelming majority of 
studies found the practice to be neutral or welfare enhancing.118 
B.  Multihoming and Gateways 
 Another oft-overlooked consideration that can mitigate the problems associated 
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with network effects is the presence of gateways between networks (also sometimes called 
adapters or converters).119 Indeed, one of the seminal articles on network effects by Katz 
and Shapiro conclude that if gateways allow perfect compatibility, all anticompetitive 
effects disappear.120 Carmen Matutes and Pierre Regibeau similarly find that if gateways 
exist that allow different actors to decide unilaterally whether their components are 
compatible with other systems by building gateways, “compatibility arises and is always 
socially optimal provided that there are no costs to achieving standardization.”121 Paul 
David and Julie Bunn likewise conclude that “initial technical incompatibilities between 
variant formulations of such technologies . . . can have their economic importance 
mitigated as a result of the ex post introduction of gateway innovations.”122 In effect, 
perfect gateways obviate the need to choose one network or the other by turning all 
component networks into one large network.  
 Even imperfect gateways can provide improved economic welfare. Joseph Farrell 
and Garth Saloner present a model that enables them to explore the implications of 
imperfect gateways. After confirming Katz and Shapiro’s conclusion that costless and 
perfect gateways eliminate any adverse impact of network effects, Farrell and Saloner 
demonstrate that the welfare impact is ambiguous when gateways are imperfect.123 
 Multihoming is a related practice that allows individual users to belong to multiple 
networks at the same time. For example, many users maintain accounts with both Uber 
and Lyft instead of choosing between them. Much like gateways, multihoming prevents 
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network adoption from being an either-or decision. Eliminating the potential for winner-
takes-all dynamics reduces any one network’s ability to exercise market power.124 The 
dynamics can be complex. For example, independent decision-making about 
multihoming can actually make the decisionmaker worse off.125 
 There is a long history of gateways helping to dissipate the impact of network 
effects. For example, the ability to read WordPerfect files facilitated the entry of Word.126 
Excel’s capacity to read Lotus 1-2-3 files helped enable it to overcome Lotus’s large 
advantage in installed base.127 The functionality of Apple computers to read DOS-
formatted floppy disks helped its adoption, as did the inclusion of chips that allowed 
them to run software created for Windows.128 Similarly, multihoming prevented Uber 
from forestalling the emergence of Lyft.129 The ability of users to subscribe to multiple 
messaging services simultaneously prevented America Online from dominating the 
market.130 The ability for users to maintain multiple zero-cost browsers and media players 
undercut the winner-take-all dynamics that lay at the heart of the Microsoft cases.131 
 Together these analyses suggest that creating gateways and multihoming can 
dissipate any monopoly power enjoyed by large networks. They provide another reason 
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that competition law cases require more than the mere assertion of the presence network 
effects. 
CONCLUSION 
 Despite attempts by recent reports to equate network effects with market failure, 
an examination of both the theoretical and empirical literature make clear that the 
relationship between network effects and market failure is more complex. Indeed, history 
is littered with once-leading digital companies that can attest to the reality that network 
effects are not sufficient by themselves to protect the dominance of early-market leaders. 
Considerations such as variation in the value of connections and the existence of 
countervailing externalities make the relationship between network effects and market 
failure ambiguous. In addition, network-effects based theories depend on the satisfaction 
of structural preconditions that must be shown in individual cases. Even when those 
preconditions are met, alternative institutional solutions exist that can mitigate or even 
dissipate the impact of network effects. All of this is informed by the history of antitrust 
and regulatory enforcement along with an emerging empirical literature showing that 
network effects can lead to a wide range of results.  
 Antitrust law has long required plaintiffs to produce a clear theory supported by 
evidence sufficient to show that a particular practice is likely to harm consumers. The 
literature and enforcement history make clear that the mere presence of network effects 
is not by itself sufficient to establish the presence of entry barriers, market dominance, or 
harm to competition. Enforcement officials should resist the temptation to treat the mere 
assertion of network effects as the basis for an enforcement action and should continue 
to rely on the traditional tools of competition law. Doing so requires doing the hard work 
to build cases, but that is nothing new and is necessary if antitrust law is to fulfill its 
responsibility of promoting the welfare of consumers. 
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